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I. INTRODUCTION
Although copyright and antitrust laws share the goal of pro-
moting innovation, the two bodies of law attempt to achieve this
end through conflicting means. Antitrust legislation promotes in-
novation and productivity by removing restraints on competition
and discouraging monopolization. Copyright laws, in contrast, at-
tempt to foster creativity by granting composers a monopoly-the
exclusive right to perform and to authorize performance of their
musical works1 for a limited period.2 Individual composers for-
merly had no practical protection of or means to derive the maxi-
mum monetary benefit from their exclusive rights because use of
their works was widespread, spontaneous, and ephemeral.3 In 1914,
however, a group of composers founded the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) to insure adequate
enforcement of the copyright laws." A group of radio broadcasters
founded another performing rights organization, Broadcast Music,
Inc. (BMI), in 1940 during a dispute with ASCAP. 5 These organi-
zations serve as clearinghouses for the licensing of music perform-
ing rights.6 Disgruntled licensees have waged antitrust attacks on
the performing rights organizations' licensing practices over the
last forty years.7 These cases require courts to balance competing
1. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 106(4) (1976).
2. See id. app. §§ 302-04.
3. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5, 20 (1979).
4. Id. at 4-5. ASCAP presently consists of approximately 21,000 writer and 8000 pub-
lisher members. Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
5. Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the Amended Final
Judgment of 1950, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119, 122-23 (1976). BMI now consists of ap-
proximately 38,000 writer and 22,000 publisher members and functions much like ASCAP.
Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 277.
6. The performing rights societies grant music users licenses to perform members'
works in return for a licensing fee based on a percentage of the music users' revenues. The
most prevalent licensing format is the blanket license that offers music users unrestricted
access to the performing rights societies' repertories during the license period. The perform-
ing rights organizations offer blanket licenses on an all-or-nothing basis. The license fee
reflects the music user's ability to pay rather than the amount of music he uses. BMI, 441
U.S. at 5; see infra notes 21 & 23 and accompanying text.
7. See Becker & Petrowitz, Play It Again Sam, But Don't Forget to Pay the Fee, 30
FED. B. NEws & J. 29, 30-32 (1983); Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies and
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antitrust and copyright policy considerations, but courts tradition-
ally have rejected legal challenges to the organizations' blanket li-
censing practices by recognizing that the benefits which derive
from enforcement of composers' exclusive rights through such li-
censes outweigh any attendant anticompetitive effects. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, how-
ever, recently diverged from the trend of protecting the performing
rights organizations' blanket licenses in Buffalo Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. ASCAP.8 Holding that blanket licensing of music perform-
ing rights to local television stations violated the antitrust laws,
the Buffalo Broadcasting court enjoined further use of the blanket
licensing system.' This decision made the Southern District of
New York one of the first courts to enjoin blanket licensing,10 and
although Buffalo Broadcasting may have remedied the inequities
present in that particular licensing situation, the decision has pro-
duced "utter chaos" in the performing rights industry.11
This Recent Development compares Buffalo Broadcasting
with other blanket licensing decisions and predicts the reversal of
Buffalo Broadcasting on appeal. Part II of this Recent Develop-
ment discusses the organization and operation of the performing
rights societies. Part III focuses on the pertinent antitrust princi-
ples and the history of antitrust litigation between the performing
rights societies and various licensees. Part IV examines recent de-
cisions addressing blanket licenses in which courts have used simi-
lar analyses yet reached differing results. Part V analyzes possible
solutions to the conflict between antitrust and copyright laws in
the blanket licensing context and concludes that resolution of this
conflict will necessitate exempting the performing rights organiza-
tions from antitrust sanctions and placing them under a system of
governmental or judicial control.
the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783, 783 & n.2 (1978).
8. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
9. The court found that the benefits of the blanket licensing system did not outweigh
the anticompetitive effects the format produced in the local television industry. The court
based its holding on the assumption that local television stations were unable to bargain at
arm's length with the performing rights organizations. Id. at 292-93; cf. BMI v. CBS, Inc.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). BMI v. CBS, Inc., another in the series
of blanket license cases, held that giant television organizations were able to bargain at
arm's length with the performing rights organizations.
10. Cf. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(requiring ASCAP to offer fees that give music users a real choice between blanket and per-
program licensing).
11. See infra rote 210 and accompanying text.
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II. PERFORMING RIGHTS SOCIETIES: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power... to promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
' 12
Congress passed the copyright laws'- pursuant to this constitu-
tional mandate and thereby granted copyright holders the exclu-
sive right to perform or to authorize others to perform the copy-
righted works.1 4 Difficulties, however, arose soon after Congress
had established the performance right in musical compositions in
1897.16 Performances of the protected musical compositions oc-
curred at various locations, such as theatres, dance halls, and tav-
erns, with such frequency that individual composers had great dif-
ficulty in detecting unauthorized uses of their works. 6 In addition,
music users had no practical means to locate and negotiate licenses
with composers whose music they wished to perform.17
A group of composers and musicians responded to these diffi-
culties by founding ASCAP in 1914.18 ASCAP's primary functions
are guarding against infringement of works in its repertory by
monitoring public performances of music, bringing copyright in-
fringement actions on behalf of its members, 9 and serving as a
clearinghouse for copyright holders by collecting and distributing
to the member composers and publishers royalties that licensees
pay.20 These composers and publishers authorize ASCAP to grant
licenses for the use of their copyrighted works. These licenses are
either blanket or per-use licenses. A blanket license costs a music
user such as a broadcaster a fiat fee, generally a percentage of the
user's advertising revenue, and entitles him to unrestricted access
to ASCAP's repertory for a specific period, usually a year.21 A per-
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
14. Id. app. § 106(4).
15. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (repealed 1906) (current version codified at
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976)).
16. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 277; 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.19 (1982).
17. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 277.
18. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. Except where otherwise indicated,
this Recent Development will refer only to ASCAP when discussing issues common to AS-
CAP and BMI.
19. But see BMI v. CBS, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that BMI lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members).
20. See Comment, Price Fixing and the Per Se Rule: A Redefinition-BMI v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 5 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 73, 75 (1980).
21. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130
[Vol. 37:183
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use license, however, costs the licensee a percentage of only those
advertising revenues that the programs which employ ASCAP mu-
sic generate.22 Both licensing systems operate on an all-or-nothing
basis-the user pays the same price whether he uses one or one
million of ASCAP's compositions during the license period. 3
III. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION
CONCERNING MUSIC PERFORMING RIGHTS AND LICENSES
A. Antitrust Principles
Courts have developed two major lines of antitrust analysis
under section 1 of the Sherman Act24 to evaluate the anticompeti-
tive effects of various business activities: the per se rule and the
rule of reason.2 5 The per se rule is a judicial time-saving mecha-
nism. If the court repeatedly has dealt with a certain business
practice that it views as "plainly anti-competitive, 26 the court
need not duplicate previous in-depth economic investigations of
the practice's effects and the history of the industry to determine
illegality. Instead, the court merely ascertains whether it has "con-
siderable experience" with the industry2 7 and whether the practice
"lack[s]. .. any redeeming virtue. '28 If the court finds that both
these conditions exist, it brands the practice per se illegal without
further analysis. 9 Courts regard activities such as resale price
maintenance,30 tying contracts,3' horizontal market restraints, 2
(2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Note, supra note 7, at
785.
22. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 282.
23. BMI, 441 U.S. at 5.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
25. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 68-72 (1977).
26. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
27. BMI, 441 U.S. at 9; United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972); see also Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165
(1964).
28. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "There are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Id.
29. BMI, 441 U.S. at 8 & n.11; Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
30. United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). An agreement to fix the
price at which a buyer may resell a product constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman
Act because it unreasonably restrains alienation and forecloses price competition among po-
tential buyers of the product. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at §§ 131-41.
31. International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). If the seller of
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and conspiracy to fix pricesss as "naked" restraints on trade whose
plainly anticompetitive effect renders them per se illegal. Courts
use the rule of reason 4 to analyze other business activities that
affect trade and allow them only if their anticompetitive effects are
not "undue. 35 Under the rule of reason, a court evaluates the ef-
fect of a business practice on competition in the relevant market"
to determine if the activity unreasonably restrains trade and
thereby violates the antitrust laws. 7
B. Performing Rights Organizations' Antitrust Litigation
1. The Consent Decrees
ASCAP and BMI, through their members, control the per-
formance rights to virtually every domestic copyrighted composi-
tion.38 Because the two performance societies dominate the licens-
product A conditions the sale of product A to a buyer on the buyer's purchase of product B,
a tie-in exists. The buyer must purchase the unwanted product B to acquire the desired
product A. The purpose of such arrangements is to give a seller who has market power over
the sale of product A concomitant market power for product B. Tying arrangements are a
per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act. See Northern Pac.
R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 150.
32. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Horizontal price re-
straints are agreements among competitors at the same level to restrict output and to raise
prices above competitive levels. For a general discussion of horizontal restraints on trade,
see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at §§ 59-107.
33. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). The Sherman Act
prohibits parties from conspiring to stifle market competition through price fixing. See L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at §§ 108-14.
34. Professor Sullivan states the rule of reason test as follows:
[A]ny concerted action which in purpose or effect would significantly hamper competi-
tion violates Section 1. Significance is judged by balancing any tendencies in the ar-
rangement to enhance competition against any tendencies to injure competition. If the
latter tendencies predominate, the arrangement is an unreasonable restraint and vio-
lates the Act.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 72.
35. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); see L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 25, at § 65.
36. See supra note 34.
37. Examples of business activities that courts have found not to restrain trade unduly
are vertical territorial and customer restraints, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and market facilitation arrangements, see Board of Trust v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 66.
38. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 742. ASCAP's composition pool includes over
three million works, while BMI's pool contains over one million compositions. Id. Another
small performing rights organization, SESAC, Inc., also exists. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.19 (1982). SESAC has approximately 300 publisher members and several hundred writer
members. It also uses the blanket licensing system. Note, supra note 7, at 783 n.1. The
industry-wide impact of small performing rights societies such as SESAC, however, is mini-
mal. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 282 n.17.
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ing of musical compositions and engage "in a large and active line
of commerce" between composers and music users, it is not sur-
prising that "[n]either ASCAP nor BMI is a stranger to antitrust
litigation."3 9 In 1941 the government filed complaints alleging that
the blanket license40 illegally restrained trade and that the pooling
of compositions with an all-or-nothing use of that pool permitted
the performing rights organizations to charge arbitrary prices.
The government's objectives were to enjoin blanket licensing and
require the organizations to institute new, less monopolistic forms
of licensing.42 The government and ASCAP settled the case by en-
tering into a consent decree .4 The decree allowed ASCAP to con-
tinue offering the blanket licensing format, but required the organ-
ization to offer users the alternative of purchasing a per-program
license. This license based its rate on advertising revenues from
the programs that actually used ASCAP music, while the blanket
licensing rate was a percentage of a user's total advertising revenue
regardless of the amount of music he used.4 4 The 1941 consent de-
cree also prohibited ASCAP from artificially inflating the price of
its license by withholding parts of its repertory from licensees.
45
The 1941 decree did not end ASCAP's antitrust troubles. As a
result of private litigation in the late 1940's, 4 the government re-
opened and substantially revised the decree in 1950.47 The 1950
amended decree, which still controls many of the organization's ac-
tivities, requires ASCAP to charge blanket and per-program li-
cense fees that offer music users a real economic choice between
39. CBS, Inc., v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 743, quoted in BMI, 441 U.S. at 10. As early
as 1934 the Justice Department investigated claims that ASCAP's conduct unduly re-
strained free competition. BMI, 441 U.S. at 10.
40. In 1941 the blanket licensing format was the only type that the performing rights
organizations offered. BMI, 441 U.S. at 10.
41. Id.; see, e.g., Complaint, United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95, at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
42. BMI, 441 U.S. at 11; Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 278.
43. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(consent decree).
44. Id.
45. Id. 56,104, at 405. The court also ordered the organization not to demand exclu-
sive licensing privileges from its members. Id. 1 56,104, at 403.
46. Movie theater owners prevailed in a private antitrust suit against ASCAP. See
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); M. Witmark & Sons v.
Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), appeal dismissed sub. nom. M. Witmark & Sons v.
Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949); infra note 207 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). For
a thorough treatment of the consent decree, see Garner, supra note 5, at 122-23.
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the two formats.48 The decree also provides for judicial determina-
tion by the Southern District of New York of a reasonable license
fee if ASCAP and a prospective licensee cannot agree on a price
after sixty days of negotiations.49 The court has never exercised its
power to set reasonable fees, however; instead, it has assumed the
role of mediator.5
2. The CBS Case
The most ambitious challenge to the blanket licensing system
to date occurred in CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 51 in which the Columbia
48. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The
existence of the consent decrees has not stopped broadcasters from continuing to challenge
the legality of the blanket license, but the courts generally have upheld the validity of the
blanket licensing system. See, e.g., K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1967). In K-91 an individual radio station sued by ASCAP for copyright infringement
raised the defense that ASCAP's blanket licensing constituted price fixing and thus violated
the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the 1950 consent decree, rejected the radio
station's antitrust violation argument, and held that the 1950 consent decree's provisions for
judicial determination of license fees "disinfected" ASCAP from any allegations of price
fixing. Id. at 4. The government, in an amicus curiae brief filed in K-91 in support of the
blanket licensing format, argued that blanket licensing is necessary because of the economic
realities of the music industry:
There are situations in which competitors have been permitted to form joint selling
agencies. . . . This case appears to us to involve such a situation. The extraordinary
number of users spread across the land, the ease with which a performance may be
broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted compositions, the enormous quantity of
separate performances each year, the impracticability of negotiating individual licenses
for each composition, and the ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to
create unique market conditions for performance rights to recorded music.
BMI, 441 U.S. at 14-15 (quoting Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae on Pet.
for Cert., K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147, at 10-11 (footnotes
omitted)).
49. The amended decree § IX(A) states:
Defendant ASCAP shall, upon receipt of a written application for a license for the right
of public performance of any, some or all of the compositions in the ASCAP repertory,
advise the applicant in writing of the fee which it deems reasonable for the license
requested. If the parties are unable to agree upon a reasonable fee within sixty (60)
days from the date when such application is received by ASCAP, the applicant there-
fore may forthwith apply to this Court [Southern District of New York] for the deter-
mination of a reasonable fee and ASCAP shall, upon receipt of notice of the filing of
such application, promptly give notice thereof to the Attorney General. In any such
proceeding the burden of proof shall be on ASCAP to establish the reasonableness of
the fee requested by it.
United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595, at 63,754.
50. See Garner, supra note 5, at 127-28; Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analy-
sis of a Political Problem, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 277, 303 (1978); Note, supra note 7, at n.51.
BMI, whose licensing practices closely parallel those of ASCAP, operates under a similar
consent decree that it entered into in 1966. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 278-79.
51. 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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Broadcasting System (CBS)52 brought suit"3 seeking to prevent
ASCAP and BMI from using a blanket license to convey nondra-
matic performing rights to television networks. 4 CBS alleged that
the blanket license format unreasonably restrained trade in viola-
tion of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act through price fixing, a
tie-in arrangement, a concerted refusal to deal, and monopoliza-
tion. In addition, CBS claimed that the organizations' blanket li-
censing practices were a misuse of copyright.5 5 The network sought
an injunction under section 16 of the Clayton Act" that would pre-
vent the use of the blanket licensing format, and in the alternative,
asked the court to require performing rights societies to offer a li-
cense on terms proportionate to CBS' actual use of music.
57
CBS wanted the court to declare blanket licensing per se ille-
gal. The network contended that ASCAP members avoided price
competition among themselves and that the pooling of composi-
tions in ASCAP's repertory enabled the organization, on behalf of
its members, to fix the price that a music user must pay to gain
performance rights.55 CBS also asserted that the blanket license
format constituted an illegal tying arrangement 9 because it forced
music users to purchase, along with desired compositions, music
they did not want and would not use.60 CBS claimed that the per-
formance rights organization's composition pooling arrangement
amounted to a concerted refusal by the members of ASCAP to deal
directly with the network in the licensing of musical composi-
tions."1 In addition, CBS claimed that, through ASCAP, writers
52. CBS operates one of the three major television networks and supplies its approxi-
mately 200 affiliates with approximately 7500 programs each year. The network is not only a
television powerhouse but also possesses enormous power within the music industry. CBS is
the world's largest manufacturer and seller of records and tapes. The network is "the giant
of the world in the use of music rights." BMI, 441 U.S. at 4 (quoting a CBS witness).
53. When CBS' contracts with BMI and ASCAP expired on December 31, 1969, the
network chose to bring an antitrust action against the performing rights organizations
rather than apply to the Southern District of New York for judicial relief pursuant to the
consent decrees. See Becker & Petrowitz, supra note 7, at 32.
54. In the alternative, CBS sought a modification of the performing rights licensing
system to enable the network to pay ASCAP a predetermined amount for each use of a
copyrighted composition. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 741.
55. Id. at 745.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
57. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 741.
58. Id. at 745.
59. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 745.
61. Id. A concerted refusal to deal is a method of cartelization by which competitors
obtain better prices as a noncompeting group than they could as competing individuals.
1984]
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and publishers monopolized the industry and that their practices
constituted copyright misuse.
62
(a) District Court Opinion: CBS I
The .district court resolved all issues favorably to ASCAP63
and rejected CBS' claims that blanket licensing violated the anti-
trust laws. The court found that ASCAP had not compelled the
network to take a blanket license because CBS, albeit with some
difficulty, could have negotiated directly with composers and pub-
lishers.64 The court's opinion carries an implication that the ability
of CBS and ASCAP, both giants in their respective fields, to nego-
tiate with one another at arm's length influenced the decision6 5
(b) Court of Appeals Opinion: CBS II
The Second Circuit reversed the holding in CBS I and found
that blanket licensing constituted illegal price fixing-a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.6 The court stated that although AS-
CAP had not compelled CBS to take a blanket license, a finding of
compulsion or coercion was not a prerequisite to a finding of illegal
price fixing.6 7 Similarly, the court found that blanket licenses did
not involve an illegal tie-in, yet recognized that this finding did not
resolve the price fixing issue. 8 The court also rejected ASCAP's
argument that CBS' proper remedy was to invoke the consent de-
cree and request the Southern District of New York to set a rea-
sonable license fee.69 The court found that the performing rights
organizations were not "disinfected" by the consent decrees, 70 and
Such a group says, in effect, "[W]e will deal with you but only on our terms and as a group."
Many, but not all, concerted refusals to deal are illegal. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 90.
62. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 745.
63. The district court articulated the issues in CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP (CBS I) as follows:
(i) Whether defendants' [performing rights organizations] conduct constitutes an ac-
tionable restraint of trade and compels the plaintiff as alleged in the complaint; [to
purchase a blanket license]
(ii) Whether, if such restraint or compulsion exists, it is reasonable and justified or
whether it may be achieved by less anti-competitive means.
Id. at 747.
64. Id. at 779-83.
65. For a recent case discussing arm's length negotiation in the music licensing indus-
try, see BMI v. CBS, Inc., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) § 65,551 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
66. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (CBS I).
67. Id. at 138; cf. United States v. SoCony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59
(1940) (neither the power nor the ability to fix prices is necessary to establish conspiracy).
68. CBS II, 562 F.2d at 135; see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
69. CBS II, 562 F.2d at 138; see supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
70. CBS II, 562 F.2d at 139. The court stated: "Nor do we think that the determina-
[Vol. 37:183
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also rejected ASCAP's argument that because the blanket license
offered a new product-unlimited access to a repertory of mu-
sic-the price setting associated with the blanket licensing format
was not a restraint of trade.7 1 Concluding that the price fixing in-
herent in blanket licensing was not an absolute necessity for the
survival of the performing rights, the court applied the per se rule
and reversed the district court's decision.
7 2
(c) Supreme Court Opinion: CBS III
Justice White, speaking for an eight member majority of the
United States Supreme Court, reversed the Second Circuit's deci-
sion and remanded the case to that court for an application of the
rule of reason.73 In reaching this decision the Court held that blan-
ket licensing was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The
Court stated in CBS III that although ASCAP and its blanket i-
censing format had been subject to "intensive antitrust scrutiny"
the Court lacked the experience with the industry necessary to
brand the activity a per se violation of the antitrust laws.7 4 In re-
jecting the Second Circuit's literal approach to price fixing, 5 the
Court stated that not all literal price fixing is per se illegal.7 " The
Court in effect classified price fixing as either "plainly anticompeti-
tion of the 'reasonableness' of the price by a court saves the price that has been fixed by a
combination from continuing to be an unlawful device in restraint of trade, absent the justi-
fication of market necessity." Id. at 138-39 (emphasis in original). The court also called
attention to the Southern District of New York's failure to set a reasonable fee throughout
the life of the decree. Id. at 139.
71. Id. ASCAP analogized a blanket license to a symphony orchestra in which the
sound produced by the whole is different from the sound produced by each musician. The
court found the analogy fallacious since the musicians in an orchestra do not join the
orchestra to avoid competing with one another. Id. at 140.
72. Id. In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit seems to have adopted plain-
tiff's "Per Se Rule with a Market-Function Exception"-a rule that "price-fixing is per se
illegal except where it is absolutely necessary for the market to function." Id. at 136. Several
commentators have suggested that the Second Circuit either created an exception to or mis-
applied the per se rule by following a per se analysis without enjoining blanket licensing.
See Comment, supra note 20, at 89; Note, supra note 7, at 796-800.
73. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (CBS III). Justice Stevens filed the lone
dissent. Id. at 25.
74. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 10; see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
75. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the composers and publishers band to-
gether into performing rights organizations that fix a price for their blanket licenses, these
practices constitute price fixing-a per se violation of the Sherman Act. CBS II, 562 F.2d at
135-36.
76. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 9. The Court gave the example of two partners who set the
price for their goods and services. The partners' activity is literally price fixing, but histori-
cally courts have not considered such activities per se illegal. Id.
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tive"-and therefore per se illegal-or subject to the rule of rea-
son-and therefore capable of evaluation only through examina-




The Court concluded that blanket licensing is necessary to
protect the rights of copyright holders and, therefore, is not a "na-
ked restraint of trade with no purpose except the stifling of compe-
tition. '7' The Court also found that a music user's purchase of a
blanket license provides a different product than his purchase of a
per-use license for the songs in ASCAP's repertory. The purchaser
of a blanket license receives a package consisting of the right to use
the licensed compositions and the performing rights organization's
aggregating service. The Court stated that "[h]ere, the whole is
truly more than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a differ-
ent product. 79 The Court viewed ASCAP not as "a joint sales
agency offering the individual goods of many sellers" but rather a
"separate seller" offering a new product-the blanket li-
cense-whose "raw material" is the copyrighted compositions of
ASCAP's members.80 Since the blanket license is a product sepa-
rate from the individual compositions and, thus, on a different
market level, ASCAP's blanket licensing format does not stifle
competition among individual composers."'
The Court concluded that blanket licensing is not a "simple
horizontal arrangement among competitors 8 2 because it neither
prevents individual composers from selling their works indepen-
dently to any purchaser at any price nor conceals other agreements
among ASCAP members concerning prices they charge for the use
77. Id. at 9. The decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332
(1982), dispels any speculation that the Court in CBS III created an exception to the gen-
eral rule that price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. In Maricopa Justice
Stevens, the dissenter in CBS III, stated unequivocably that price fixing-in this instance
the setting of prices for medical services-violates the antitrust laws per se. Id. at 342; see
also Becker & Petrowitz, supra note 7, at 33.
78. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 20. The Court found that ASCAP's conduct was an inte-
grated, efficient method of controlling unauthorized uses of copyrighted compositions. For a
thorough discussion of integration, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 59.
79. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. n.40. The Maricopa Court refused to extend this reasoning to a medical associ-
ation; the Court found that the medical association did not sell a product separate from that
of individual doctors, but merely gained a competitive advantage in attracting patients.
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356.
82. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 23. For a thorough discussion of horizontal restraints of trade,
see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at §§ 59-114; supra note 32.
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of their individual works.83 The Court also recognized that ASCAP
was operating under consent decrees and that CBS had the option,
which it failed to exercise, of asking the District Court for the
Southern District of New York to set a fee for the network's music
use.84 The court, therefore, held that blanket licensing is not per se
illegal and thus is subject to a rule of reason analysis88 The Court
remanded the case to the Second Circuit for application of the rule
of reason, declining to consider that issue itself.8"
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, agreed with the majority's
holding that ASCAP's blanket licensing format was not a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, 7 but disagreed with the majority's
decision to remand the case for an application of the rule of rea-
son. Justice Stevens maintained that the Court properly could
reach the issue whether ASCAP's blanket licensing practices vio-
lated the rule of reason. He then analyzed the facts of the case
under the rule of reason and concluded that the blanket licensing
format was "a classic example of economic discrimination," 8 which
the Sherman Act proscribes as "a monopolistic restraint of
trade."89 Justice Stevens found ASCAP's all-or-nothing blanket li-
censing system "patently discriminatory" 90 because the organiza-
tion based the rate on the user's ability to pay91 rather than on
factors such as the cost, quantity, or quality of the product that
usually affect a product's price in a competitive market.2 The Jus-
tice emphasized that ASCAP's blanket licensing program forced
music users to pay inflated prices for music they neither wanted
83. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 24; see supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
85. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 24.
86. Id. at 25. The Second Circuit, applying the rule of reason on remand, found, unlike
the dissent in CBS III, that the blanket licensing practices of the performing rights societies
did not violate the antitrust laws. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980). The
Supreme Court then denied certiorari. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
87. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's finding that blanket licensing enabled
the performing rights organizations to offer a product separate from that of the individual
composers. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens insisted, however,
that this new product-the aggregating and licensing of a pool of compositions--was never-
theless "a monopolistic restraint of trade proscribed by the Sherman Act." CBS III, 441
U.S. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 38.
90. Id. at 30.
91. ASCAP based its licensing rates on a percentage of the music user's advertising
revenues. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
92. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nor intended to use.9 3 Justice Stevens also suggested that blanket
licensing increased the earnings of popular composers while dis-
couraging the use of works by unknown songwriters, 4 and that it
prevented new songwriters from breaking into the market by offer-
ing their works for sale at a lower price. 5 Finally, the dissent as-
serted that the concerted activities of the performing rights organi-
zations unnecessarily prevented the market from being com-
petitive.9 6 Justice Stevens concluded that blanket licensing unrea-
sonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act because it
fostered "marketwide price discrimination and significant barriers
to entry [into the market]. 97
IV. AFTERMATH OF CBS III
A. Trend of Allowing Blanket Licenses:
Moor-Law and F.E.L. Publications
1. Moor-Law
In BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc.,98 the performing rights organiza-
tion brought a copyright infringement suit99 for the unauthorized
use of BMI compositions in defendant's nightclub, the Triple
Nickel. Moor-Law, Inc. raised the affirmative defense of copyright
misuse and counterclaimed that BMI had violated the antitrust
laws because its failure to offer a realistic alternative to the blan-
ket license constituted an illegal tie-in.100
93. Under the ASCAP blanket licensing system, no competition exists between musi-
cal compositions. Id. at 32 & n.19. The licensee pays one price for access to ASCAP's entire
repertory. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
94. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since a music user pays the same
price for access to a hit as for access to a little known work, the licensee naturally will use
the popular song repeatedly instead of using a new, less well-known song.
95. Id. at 32-33.
96. Id. at 33. Justice Stevens rejected ASCAP's argument that the abolition of blanket
licensing and the introduction of competition into the market would force a decrease in the
price of performance rights, thereby leaving composers inadequately paid for their labors.
He stated that "a conclusion that excessive competition would cause one side of the market
more harm than good may justify a legislative exemption from the antitrust laws, but does
not constitute a defense to a violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 34-35; see National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978).
97. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
99. For a recent decision holding that a performing rights organization lacked standing
to bring a copyright infringement action on behalf of its members, see BMI v. CBS, Inc.,
1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,661 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
100. Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 765; see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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The district court relied on CBS III as controlling precedent
and held that BMI's use of a blanket license was not an antitrust
violation because the fee for the blanket license was a reasonable
percentage of the establishment's entertainment expenses.101 The
Moor-Law court decided that the per se antitrust analysis should
not apply because the court lacked the expertise to determine
whether defendant's conduct within the unique performing rights
market constituted blatant anticompetitive action.0 2 The court in-
stead applied the rule of reason analysis and proceeded to inquire
whether the actual and potential adverse impacts of blanket licens-
ing outweighed the format's positive contributions to the market.
Analyzing the benefits and costs of blanket licensing, the court
determined that blanket licensing restrained trade in three ways:
(1) by eliminating price competition among BMI's composer mem-
bers, (2) by depriving music users of control over their total obliga-
tion to BMI, and (3) by erecting barriers to entry into the mar-
ket.108 The court stated bluntly that "[t]he first and most obvious
restraint of trade ... is ... the elimination of price competition
among those whose compositions are in [the performing rights or-
ganization's] pool of music.' ' 0" The court found that, by banding
together and selling their compositions on an all-or-nothing basis,
the members of performing rights organizations frustrate active
price competition, and that their conditioning the availability of a
popular song on the purchase of undesired works borders upon a
tie-in violation. 0 5 The court also acknowledged that a club such as
the Triple Nickel is unable to regulate the amount it owes per-
forming rights organizations because these organizations charge a
fixed price that depends, not on factors in the control of the music
user, such as the number of performances of a given composition,
but rather on less controllable factors, such as the amount of the
club's entertainment expenses."0 6 Finally, the court found that the
music user has an incentive to resist the entry of smaller perform-
ing rights organizations into the market, because given the limited
performance time available to the music user, he would prefer to
obtain compositions under one all-or-nothing blanket license than
101. Entertainment expenses are the cost to the establishment of hiring musicians.
Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 760.
102. Id. at 765.
103. Id. at 765-67.
104. Id. at 765.




to buy several blanket licenses from different organizations at a
higher total cost.1""
The Moor-Law court, however, also set forth several compel-
ling factors that it ultimately used to justify the use of blanket
licenses. These factors included the following: (1) The reduction of
transaction costs; (2) the inability of clubs to identify which com-
positions they would use on any particular occasion; (3) the inevi-
table increase in monitoring costs in the absence of blanket licens-
ing; and (4) the relative inexpensiveness of administering a license
based on entertainment costs.10 8 The court determined that the
potential transaction costs of individual license negotiations be-
tween copyright owners and music users were substantial, and that
blanket licensing of a pool of compositions therefore provided a
practical means to complete the transaction cheaply.10 9 The court
also perceived a need for some form of blanket license to prevent
unauthorized uses by establishments that could not predict which
materials they would use on any given occasion. °110 Additionally,
the court felt that monitoring expenses would rise dramatically if a
judicially mandated, limited license forced BMI to oversee more
closely the music use of licensee clubs.1 Finally, the court recog-
nized that pricing based on an establishment's entertainment ex-
penses necessarily is a rough estimate. The court, nevertheless,
maintained that such a system would not be difficult to administer,
especially since establishments already had to record entertain-
ment expense information for tax reasons.
11 2
Defendant in Moor-Law proposed two alternatives to blanket
licensing-a mini-blanket license based on the category of music
that a licensee used, and alternative pricing that would compute
license costs through retroactive determination of the amount of
BMI music that licensees played each year-but the court rejected
both proposals." 3 The district court proposed two alternatives of
107. Id. at 766-67. The court stated that if new performing rights organizations enter-
ing the market offer only all-or-nothing licenses, the music user "may face a higher total
price with each additional seller, rather than a reallocation of total price among different
sellers." Id. at 766.





113. The court rejected the mini-blanket license because the difficulties inherent in
strictly categorizing music would cause market uncertainty. Id. at 768. Cross-over hit songs,
for example, appeal to more than one audience. In addition, the differences in the style of
various performances of a particular work might result in assignment of one song to multi-
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its own, however: concentration of market power with the buyer/
music user rather than with the performing rights organizations,
and some form of continuing governmental regulation that would
set and modify license prices.114 Since judicial opinion cannot shift
the concentration of market power and since governmental regula-
tion is the province of Congress, however, the court entered judge-
ment for BMI. 115
2. F.E.L. Publications
In F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,""
a hymnal publisher brought a copyright infringement suit against
defendant. 117 F.E.L., which used royalties to purchase copyrights
directly from individual composers, had allowed Catholic parishes
to use its compositions in their custom-made hymnals at a cost of
two cents per song for each copy of the compositions contained in
the hymnals. Since unauthorized use of F.E.L. compositions was
widespread, however, F.E.L. in 1972 developed an Annual Copy-
right License (ACL) that enabled music users to copy an unlimited
number of F.E.L. compositions upon the payment of a yearly li-
cense fee.1 18 The ACL, however, failed to halt unauthorized uses.
F.E.L., believing that infringers would not heed the requirements
of the ACL, filed suit in 1976 for copyright infringement and anti-
trust violations.11 9
ple musical classifications. The court also recognized that a mini-license would "involve cat-
egorization costs, additional policing costs, and the costs of resolving. . . disputes over the
scope of the license." Id. (footnotes omitted). The court then applied the rule of rea-
son-"whether the restriction actually implemented is 'fairly necessary' in the circum-
stances of the particular case, or whether the restriction exceeds the outer limits of restraint
reasonably necessary to protect the defendant"-and found that the mini-license was not a
practical alternative. Id. at 769 (quoting American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975)).
114. Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 772.
115. The court, however, did recognize that "price regulation pursuant to legislative
directive may well be the ultimate answer to the absence of price competition in this mar-
ket." Id. at 771.
116. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,632 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. The defendant, the Catholic Bishop of Chicago, is an Illinois corporation that
owns all Catholic parish property within the archdiocese of Chicago. Id. at 73,461.
118. F.E.L. owned the rights to approximately 1400 hymns. The yearly license fee was
$100, and the terms of the licensing contract stated that upon failing to renew the license
the licensee must destroy all copies of compositions made pursuant to the ACL. F.E.L. also
offered a one-time use license that allowed a music user to copy the publisher's hymns for
use on a single occasion. In addition, the publisher sold songbooks, sheet music, and printed
hymnals. The ACL, however, was the only licensing method that permitted parishes to use
copyrighted compositions in their traditional custom-made hymnals. Id. at 73,461.
119. Id. F.E.L. also claimed that the Bishop's actions violated the Lanham Act, 15
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The district court, holding that the ACL arrangement was a
tying contract and thus a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
granted the Bishop's motion for summary judgment. 20 The district
court agreed with the Bishop's argument that the ACL allowed the
purchase of the publisher's most popular songs only if the parish
also bought access to the inferior songs, and found F.E.L.'s prac-
tice of refusing "to license one or more copyrights unless another is
accepted" per se illegal.12'
The Seventh Circuit, however, finding F.E.L. indistinguishable
from CBS 111,122 determined that the application of the per se rule
was inappropriate in light of the ACL's positive effects upon com-
petition.123 The court then applied the rule of reason, which called
for a balancing of the ACL's procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects. 124 The Seventh Circuit found such balancing unnecessary,
however, because the ACL had no anticompetitive effects. The
court reasoned that since the ACL was a "singular commodity"'2 5
consisting of a combination of individual song licenses plus the
publisher's aggregating service, it could not be part of a per se ille-
gal tie-in. 2 ' Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
blanket licenses offered through the ACL did not inhibit competi-
tion or otherwise restrain trade because alternative means were
available to obtain access to F.E.L.'s copyrighted compositions. 27
Hence, no antitrust violation existed.
The courts in Moor-Law and F.E.L., therefore, have followed
the Supreme Court's decision in CBS III and have applied the rule
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), and Illinois statutes and common law forbidding unfair
competition.
120. F.E.L., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,632, at 73,462; see supra note 31 and ac-
companying text.
121. Id. at 73,464. The court analogized F.E.L.'s conduct to that of the movie industry
in the block booking cases. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158-59 (1948). In Paramount, the major movie studios forced theatres to take inferior
films-the tied product-if they wanted to book the first rate films-the tying product. The
Court held that the tactic was a per se antitrust violation. For a thorough discussion of
block booking, see L. SuLLIvAN, supra note 25, at §§ 158-59.
122. F.E.L., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,632, at 73,464.
123. Id. at 73,465.
124. Id. at 73,466-67; National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978); see supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
125. F.E.L., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,632 at 73,465; see supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
126. F.E.L., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) . 64,632, at 73,465. The court stated: "Because
the ACL is a singular commodity-musical compositions-there can be no tied or tying
product." Id.
127. Id. at 73,466; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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of reason analysis to antitrust challenges of blanket licensing sys-
tems. These decisions have established that the blanket license is
allowable because its procompetitive effects outweigh its anticom-
petitive aspects. The CBS III holding, then, has nurtured an
emerging trend in the case law to find that blanket licenses do not
violate the antitrust laws. The holding in Buffalo Broadcasting,
however, raises doubt as to whether this trend will continue.
B. Buffalo Broadcasting: A Departure from
Judicial Acceptance of Blanket Licensing
In Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP 128 a group of owners
and operators of local television stations12 brought a class action
against the performing rights organizations. The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the blanket licensing format that ASCAP and BMI offered
local television stations as violative of the antitrust laws. The
plaintiffs also sought an injunction against blanket licensing so
that competitive licensing systems could evolve. Holding that blan-
ket licensing of music performing rights to local television stations
unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act, the
court enjoined ASCAP and BMI from continuing their anticompe-
titive practices.13 0 In reaching its decision in Buffalo Broadcasting,
the court first examined the programming needs of the local televi-
sion stations and then discussed the antitrust conflict inherent in
offering the blanket license to these independent stations.
1. Local Television Station Programming
Of the 750 local television stations currently in operation, ap-
proximately 600 affiliate with a major network; the others are inde-
pendent.13 1 Local television stations fill their broadcasting hours
with programming from three sources: network programming, lo-
cally produced programming, and syndicated programming.1 3 2 All
128. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
129. A local television station is a commercial television station, which the FCC has
licensed to broadcast, that none of the three major networks owns or operates. The major
networks, which own or operate 15 stations, were not part of the Buffalo Broadcasting ac-
tion. The plaintiff class in Buffalo Broadcasting consisted of approximately 450 indepen-
dent owners of some 750 local television stations. The All-Industry Television Station Music
License Committee had represented the local stations in their performance rights negotia-
tions with ASCAP and BMI since 1949. Id. at 276-77 & n.2.
130. Id. at 296.
131. Id. at 279.
132. Id. Both network affiliates and independent stations use these three sources.
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of these programs utilize musical compositions.133 The complaint
in Buffalo Broadcasting, however, concerned only the right to use
the music that syndicated programming contained.1 34 Because syn-
dicated programming was essential to the survival of local televi-
sion stations,135 local stations within the same television market
competed actively to obtain the broadcast rights to popular syndi-
cations from the producers. This intense competition, combined
with the economic necessity of acquiring the most desirable shows,
prevented local stations from bargaining at arm's length with the
producers of the more popular syndicated programs. 36 Because the
producers of these programs had exclusive control over the music
that their programs contained, the local stations had to accept this
preselected music if they wanted to air the programs.13 7 Although
local television stations acquired the broadcast rights to syndicated
programs from the producer, however, the licensing of the music
that syndicated shows used""8 was separate from the licensing of all
other rights in the program. 3 9 Thus, the local television stations
could not benefit from the producer's purchase of synchronization
and performance rights 40 for the music that their syndicated pro-
gramming contained. Instead, the local stations had to acquire a
133. Id. at 281. The music broadcast by local television stations, whether network affil-
iates or independents, falls into three categories: theme, feature, and background music.
Theme music is a composition that introduces or closes a program. Background music en-
hances the action on the screen. Feature music is the sole object of the viewer's attention,
such as a song that an artist performs on camera. The majority of music that local stations
use in their non-network programming consists of background and theme music for the sta-
tion's syndicated programs. Id.
134. Music that network programming used was not at issue in Buffalo Broadcasting
because the networks obtained blanket licenses from the performing rights organizations.
Since each local station paid for a portion of the network's license, a local station did not
need an additional license from ASCAP to broadcast music included in network program-
ming. Id. at 282 n.16. Local stations also could determine the selection and amount of music
that their locally produced programming used. Id. at 281.
135. The court stated: "It was clearly established at trial that broadcast of syndicated
programming is essential to the successful and profitable operation of virtually all local tele-
vision stations." Id. at 279. Syndicated programming makes up between 65% and 75% of a
local station's nonnetwork programming. Syndicated programming consists mainly of mo-
tion pictures and rerun series, but it also includes any material that producers and distribu-
tors offer local stations for broadcasting as nonetwork programming. Thirty-five percent of
syndicated programming consists of first-run programs produced especially for off-network
syndication. Id.
136. Id. at 280.
137. See id. at 281.
138. ASCAP and BMI own the performance rights to the bulk of these compositions.
Id. at 281.




blanket license from ASCAP to perform the syndicated program-
ming music.""
2. Discussion
The plaintiff class of local station owners and operators argued
that the granting of performance rights to local stations through
the blanket license was "needless, anomalous, inefficient and coer-
cive."'' 4 2 They contended that the splitting of musical performance
rights from the television performance rights in syndicated pro-
gramming 4 3 was inherently unfair and led to an absence of compe-
tition in the market. Furthermore, the plaintiffs urged that since a
blanket license was a prerequisite to airing the syndicated pro-
gramming so vital to the success of the local stations,' the very
existence of blanket licensing prohibited local stations from seek-
ing reasonable alternatives to the existing format. The plaintiffs
also believed that an injunction against blanket licensing would re-
sult in local stations' procuring music performing rights directly
from the syndicators, who already would have obtained licenses
from authors and publishers.'
4 5
The defendants claimed that the court should have dismissed
the action because Buffalo Broadcasting simply was a "rerun" of
CBS 111.4" The court, however, stated that CBS III was control-
ling precedent and the rule of reason was the proper standard to
apply.' 47 The court then conducted a two-part inquiry. First, the
court considered whether realistically available alternatives to
blanket licensing of music performing rights to local television sta-
tions existed. Second, if no realistically available alternatives to
blanket licensing existed, the court analyzed whether the format's
anticompetitive effects outweighed its procompetitive effects.'
48
141. Id.
142. Id. at 285.
143. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
145. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 285. The plaintiffs also desired the oppor-
tunity to negotiate directly with composers for the performing rights to music that locally
produced programming used. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 285-86.
148. Id. at 286.
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(a) Realistically Available Alternatives to Blanket Licenses
The court evaluated several factors before concluding that no
alternative to blanket licensing was realistically available for local
television stations.149 Judge Gagliardi first determined that realisti-
cally available alternatives do not include "those alternatives so
costly or inefficient as to be impractical and unappealing to any
user choosing freely."' 150 The Buffalo Broadcasting court stated
that an alternative remained realistically available if the transition
from the blanket licensing system to the alternative could be com-
pleted within one year.1 5 The court discounted the importance of
the fact that most local stations use blanket licenses, 52 however,
by assuming that many local television stations would choose an
alternative form of licensing if it were available. 53 According to
the court, local stations have not sought actively an alternative li-
censing format, but instead merely have acquiesced in the develop-
ment and maintenance of blanket licensing. The court believed lo-
cal stations' behavior amounted to a grudging acceptance of
blanket licensing as an inevitability of the industry; thus, the court
rejected defendants' claim that local stations freely had chosen the
blanket license over other available alternatives.' 5 4
The court then proceeded to evaluate alternative forms of li-
censing: per-program licensing, direct licensing, and source licens-
ing. The court recognized that the per-program license'5 5 was
available pursuant to the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, 56
which required the performing rights societies to offer per-program
licenses in addition to blanket licenses. Only 2 local stations held
per-program licenses, however, while 748 stations operated under
blanket licenses. 57 Per-program licensing also entailed onerous re-
porting obligations, and its rates were seven times that of blanket
149. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that an alternative is realistically avail-
able if it is efficient and immediately available as well as defendant's contention that an
alternative is realistically available if it is feasible. Id.
150. Id.; see CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
151. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 287; see CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d at
937-38; CBS I, 400 F. Supp. at 759.
152. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
153. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 287.
154. Id. at 288.
155. The per-program license operates on an all-or-nothing basis, but unlike the blan-
ket license, bases its rate on a percentage of the advertising revenues from programs which
actually use ASCAP music. See supra notes 21-23 & 44 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
157. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 288.
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licensing. ' The court, therefore, concluded that per-program li-
censes, since they were neither time- nor cost-efficient, were not a
realistically available alternative to blanket licenses. 59
The court next considered direct licensing, which provides for
direct negotiation between local television stations and individual
composers. Plaintiffs claimed that obtaining performance rights li-
censes from thousands of individual composers would be exorbi-
tantly expensive and practically impossible for local stations.10
ASCAP, however, maintained that direct licensing was a realisti-
cally available alternative. Defendants reasoned that if local sta-
tions actively pursued direct licensing, efficient alternatives to the
performing rights organizations would arise to serve as clearing-
houses for direct licensing.161 The court rejected defendants' con-
tention and found that any attempt by local stations to implement
direct licensing necessarily would fail due to local stations' lack of
bargaining power in the music industry.1 6 2 The court concluded
that direct licensing might be a realistic alternative for a powerful
network like CBS"'5 but not for plaintiffs' local television stations.
Under source licensing, the third alternative form of licensing
that the court considered, producers of syndicated programming
obtain necessary performing rights licenses from the source-the
composers-and pass those rights to the local television stations.1 4
Plaintiffs argued that source licensing was not currently an availa-
ble alternative to blanket licensing, but that if the court enjoined
blanket licensing, source licensing naturally would evolve as the
most efficient licensing system. 65 The court recognized that the
producers of syndicated programming would not change to source
licensing willingly without an injunction of blanket licensing. 6'
158. Id. at 288-89.
159. Id. at 289.
160. Id. at 289-90.
161. Defendants suggested the Harry Fox Agency as a possible alternative. The Harry
Fox Agency licenses synchronization rights to the music in television shows and motion pic-
tures. Defendants maintained that this agency could "expand its operations to include per-
forming rights." Id. at 290; see supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
162. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 291.
163. See supra note 52.
164. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 291.
165. Id.
166. The court determined that the syndicators' recalcitrance was due to inertia and
affiliated publishing interests. Unless local stations were willing to pay the syndicators a
premium price, the syndicators would have little incentive to depart from blanket licensing.
Moreover, most of the syndicators have affiliated publishing companies that receive royal-
ties under the blanket licensing system and source licensing would cause a great loss in
revenues to these affiliates. Id. at 292.
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Furthermore, the court found that local stations lacked the market
power to force syndicators to adopt source licensing and that any
requests for change would go unheeded because the syndicators
had no incentive to disrupt the blanket licensing system.67 The
court, therefore, determined that none of the three alternatives to
blanket licensing were realistically available to the local television
stations.
(b) The Anticompetitive and Procompetitive Effects of Blanket
Licenses
After finding no suitable alternative to blanket licenses, the
court turned its attention to the second major considera-
tion-whether the procompetitive effects of blanket licensing
predominate over the anticompetitive effects. The court identified
four anticompetitive effects of blanket licensing.168 First, the all-or-
nothing access that the blanket licenses provide to the pool of
compositions6 9 prevents local television stations from competing
freely for the individual compositions they want. A local station
wishing to avoid copyright infringement, therefore, has little choice
but to obtain rights to ASCAP's entire repertory by means of a
blanket license. 17 0 The local station is thus unable to economize by
obtaining only the music it desires.17 1 Second, compositions con-
trolled by a single performing rights organization do not compete
with one another.17 2 The local station has no incentive to use new
or little-known works because it can broadcast an established, fa-
mous song at the same cost.173 Blanket licensing thus prohibits free
competition by preventing newcomers from successfully entering
the music market. Third, the price that local television stations
pay for music performing rights is not the result of arm's length
negotiation. The local station has no control over the music that
the producer selects for syndicated programming, yet must pay an
extra fee to the music rights organizations for the use of the com-
position. 7 4 This system of splitting performing rights in syndi-
167. Id. at 292-93.
168. Id. at 293-94.
169. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
170. See Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 281-82. Although a limited licensing
format could provide for the music needs of the local television station, such licenses were
not a viable alternative.
171. Id. at 293-94.
172. See CBS 11, 441 U.S. at 32 & n.19.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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cated programming unduly insulates composers and copyright
holders from price competition. Last, the price of a blanket license
to a particular local station reflects that station's financial success
rather than the worth of the product itself'75-contrary to the
competitive market's pricing of products based on worth.
The court also analyzed the procompetitive effects of blanket
licensing. First, the court stated that blanket licenses are a market
necessity for small establishments, such as the Triple Nickel saloon
in Moor-Law,17 6 that cannot predict their music needs.1 Second,
because virtually all local television stations have chosen a blanket
license over a per program license, defendants argued that blanket
licensing was the winner in a competitive struggle with its available
alternatives.17 8 The court found this argument unpersuasive and
concluded that although most television stations currently operate
under blanket licenses, they have not chosen this alternative
freely.179 Third, defendants contended that local stations use more
varied music because the blanket license allows unlimited use of
the compositions for one fee. The court conceded this point, but
concluded that since competition did not exist among ASCAP's
pooled compositions, access to an unlimited number of works was
no guarantee of competition in the pricing of music use.1 80 Fourth,
defendants argued that because blanket licensing required only an
annual agreement between ASCAP and the All-Industry Television
Station License Committee, a great reduction in the transaction
costs of obtaining performance rights occurred. 8 ' The court con-
ceded that some savings in transaction costs resulted, but charac-
terized the impact as "negligible."' 8 Fifth, ASCAP contended that
blanket licensing eliminated the huge monitoring costs that would
result under other licensing systems. The court rejected this con-
tention and found that the real purpose of monitoring under blan-
ket licensing was to facilitate the distribution of royalty payments
rather than to detect unauthorized uses of copyrighted composi-
175. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 294; see supra notes 21, 91-92 and accom-
panying text.
176. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
177. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 294. The court recognized that local televi-
sion stations prerecorded the vast majority of their programming and that unexpected mu-
sic use was therefore rare. Id. at 279-80.
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 288, 293-94.
180. Id. at 294; see infra note 218 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 129.
182. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 295.
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tions. 18 The court recognized that no necessity for an elaborate
monitoring system existed because local television stations would
not want.to risk copyright infringement liability by failing to ob-
tain performing rights to the music they broadcasted.184 Thus, the
court ultimately determined that the reduction in monitoring costs
provided by blanket licensing was "not significant in the context of
the local television industry.1 . 85 Sixth, defendants claimed that by
eliminating the need for the syndicated program producer to
purchase music performing rights, blanket licensing reduced the
up-front costs of producing a syndicated program.186 The court
found this benefit "insignificant" since the cost of television per-
forming rights, including music performing rights, was infinitesi-
mal in comparison with the other costs that syndicators incurred
to produce a program. 87 Last, the defendants argued that blanket
licensing offered individual music users the most flexibility by pro-
viding them access to a performing rights organization's full reper-
tory at all times. The court stated that although maximum flex-
ibility is important for music users who cannot predict their
needs,1 88 the advantage is slight for the majority of local television
stations, which prerecord most of their programming.189 The Buf-
falo Broadcasting court's ultimate determination, therefore, was
that the procompetitive aspects of blanket licensing did not equal
or surpass the anticompetitive effects resulting from the absence of
price competition that blanket licensing visits upon the local tele-
vision industry.
(c) Result and Consequences in Buffalo Broadcasting
After deciding that ASCAP's blanket licensing scheme vio-
lated antitrust principles, the district court examined the conse-
quences that an injunction would have on the local television in-
dustry 90 and concluded that an injunction should issue. In its
analysis the court assumed that if it enjoined blanket licensing,
then source licensing'9 ' would evolve as the most efficient licensing






188. See supra notes 98-115 & 177 and accompanying text.
189. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 295-96.
190. Id. at 296.
191. See supra note 164-66 and accompanying text.
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system, and that if the injunction did not issue, then the producers
of syndicated programming would not change to this alternative
form of licensing.192 The court reasoned that source licensing
would allow all syndicated program producers to compete for the
various music performance rights, thereby promoting competition
among musical compositions.19 3 The court compared the effects
that blanket licensing and source licensing would have on competi-
tion in the music industry, and applying the rule of reason, dis-
missed ASCAP's arguments.19 4 The court held that blanket licens-
ing of music performing rights to local television stations was an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act and enjoined the practice, presumably to permit the
evolution of source licensing. 195
The Buffalo Broadcasting court failed to apply the new prod-
uct analysis that the CBS III decision espoused1 98 even though it
acknowledged CBS III as "controlling precedent.' 197 The district
court concluded that Buffalo Broadcasting was distinguishable
from CBS III because local television stations, unlike major net-
works, lacked the market power and resources either to induce
syndicators to adopt source licensing'9" or to institute direct licens-
192. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
193. Under a source licensing system, producers would procure music performing
rights for their syndicated programming and pass these rights on to local television stations.
194. Having already dismissed defendants' arguments on blanket licensing's procom-
petitive effects, the court was unimpressed by defendants' claim that if an injunction issued
prohibiting blanket licensing, copyright holders would unite to form an anticompetitive la-
bor guild exempted from antitrust attack. The court stated that a threat of unionization
could not deter it from remedying an antitrust violation. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp.
at 296.
195. Id. The performing rights organizations are appealing the decision.
196. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The CBS III majority, applying
the new product analysis, decided that blanket licensing was not a per se violation and
remanded the case to the Second Circuit for an application of the rule of reason. Justice
Stevens, dissenting, felt that the Court should not have remanded the case. He instead ap-
plied the rule of reason to the facts of CBS III and determined that blanket licensing unrea-
sonably restrained trade. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 25-38 (1979); see supra notes 87-97 and ac-
companying text. The Buffalo Broadcasting decision parallels Justice Stevens' dissent in
CBS III. Justice Stevens, because of his stance on blanket licensing in CBS III, probably
would find the performing rights organizations' actions in Buffalo Broadcasting even more
unreasonable given the local television stations' lack of arm's length bargaining power with
ASCAP and BMI. On remand, the Second Circuit determined that ASCAP's blanket licens-
ing format, which conveyed nondramatic performing rights to television networks, was not
an antitrust violation. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari, 450 U.S. 970 (1981)-an indication that it approved the Second Circuit's
application of the rule of reason.
197. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 285.
198. "The court therefore finds that plaintiffs can neither compel source licensing by
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ing.199 Resolution of the Buffalo Broadcasting appeal, therefore,
depends upon whether the court of appeals finds the case distin-
guishable from or consistent with CBS III. If the Second Circuit
does not distinguish Buffalo Broadcasting from CBS III, then mu-
sic performing rights packages that local television stations
purchase are "new products," and the licensed compositions them-
selves constitute "raw material. 200 This finding would mandate a
conclusion that the blanket license in Buffalo Broadcasting pro-
duces no anticompetitive effect,20 1 does not substantially impede
trade, and therefore does not violate the antitrust laws.202 If the
appellate court finds Buffalo Broadcasting distinguishable from
CBS III, however, it must affirm the district court's decision.2 03
V. ANALYSIS
After the enactment of the amended consent decree20 4 and
prior to Buffalo Broadcasting, courts uniformly rejected legal chal-
lenges to blanket licensing.20 5 The Second Circuit's decision in
CBS 11206 arguably was the first decision since Alden-Rochelle, Inc.
demanding it nor achieve source licensing by requesting it. Those with the incentive to
change the system lack the power; those with the power lack the incentive." Buffalo Broad-
casting, 546 F. Supp. at 292-93; see supra note 166-67 and accompanying text.
199. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 291; see supra notes 160-63 and accompa-
nying text.
200. See CBS III, 441 U.S. at 21-23; see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
201. CBS III, 441 U.S. at 22 n.40; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
202. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at § 68.
203. One commentator has stated:
The strength of the court's decision in Buffalo Broadcasting is its recognition of the
wide variations in the use of music in different music markets. The District Judge did
not assume that because blanket licensing is appropriate to one market it is appropri-
ate to all as apparently was determined by the Broadcast Music [CBS] decisions and,
instead undertook to examine the licensing arrangement with particular attention to
the specific requirements of independent television stations.
Becker & Petrowitz, supra note 7, at 34.
204. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g. CBS III, 441 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding blanket license is not price fixing
and thus not a per se violation of Sherman Act), aff'd on remand, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981); K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1967) (rejecting radio station's defense that blanket licensing constitutes an illegal
form of price fixing), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d
1003 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding third party has no standing to punish ASCAP for contempt for
failure to comply with amended consent decree), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); United
States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 1971 Trade Ca. (CCH) 1
73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (television network not entitled to limited license); Cirace, supra
note 50, at 299; Note, supra note 7, at 792; Note, The ASCAP Consent Decree: The Effect
on Potential Litigants, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 418 (1968).
206. The Second Circuit determined ASCAP's blanket licensing of nondramatic per-
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v. ASCAP107 to uphold an attack on blanket licensing. In CBS III,
however, the Supreme Court adhered to the traditional view favor-
ing blanket licensing, reversed the Second Circuit's decision, and
remanded the case to that court for an application of the rule of
reason. Two post-CBS III decisions, Moor-Law20a and F.E.L.,20 9
also followed the pro-blanket licensing trend. The courts in Moor-
Law and F.E.L. applied the rule of reason analysis and concluded
that blanket licensing was allowable. The Buffalo Broadcasting
court, applying the same rule of reason, invalidated a blanket li-
censing system. Whether Buffalo Broadcasting is an anomaly, an
indication of a new trend rejecting blanket licensing, or a decision
limited strictly to its facts, the case nevertheless disrupts the music
licensing systemand fails to provide uniform guidelines for future
action.21 o
The Buffalo Broadcasting and CBS decisions are arguably
consistent if one assumes the courts tailored their decisions to the
relative bargaining strengths of the parties. In CBS III the Su-
preme Court surmised that a giant television network " held equal
bargaining strength with the powerful performing rights organiza-
tions, '1 2 and that ASCAP's practices, therefore, were not antitrust
violations. The Buffalo Broadcasting court, in contrast, found that
forming rights to CBS constituted a per se antitrust violation. See supra notes 66-72 and
accompanying text.
207. 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Plaintiffs in Alden-Rochelle owned 200 movie
theatres and defendant ASCAP controlled 80% of the musical compositions that the motion
pictures used. The performing rights society issued blanket licenses to the plaintiffs, permit-
ting them to perform music that accompanied the films they exhibited. The court held that
ASCAP's practice of withholding performing rights unless the plaintiffs obtained blanket
licenses violated the Sherman Act. Id.
208. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
210. A music industry trade publication describes the confusion that the Buffalo
Broadcasting decision engendered:
ASCAP and BMI are girding for a potential chain reaction of financial battering in
the wake of the Federal Court decision here [New York] declaring blanket licensing of
performance rights for independent television stations in violation of antitrust
laws ...
At issue is an annual take of about $80 million, or approximately one-third of all
performance revenues realized by ASCAP and BMI. The senior society is estimated to
earn some $50 million from independent television, with $30 million going to BMI.
Ed Cramer, president of BMI, tags the Gagliardi opinion as "the most significant
decision in decades in terms of potential impact." He sees "utter chaos" the prospect in
clearing music for indie [independent] t.v. if the decision is upheld.
T.V. License Ruling Stirs Storm, BILLBOARD, Sept. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
211. See supra note 52.
212. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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local television stations213 were powerless to demand or facilitate
any changes in the current music rights licensing system, and that
ASCAP's activities, therefore, unreasonably restrained trade.214
Disparity in bargaining strength, however, does not provide a basis
for explaining the decisions in F.E.L. and Moor-Law. In F.E.L. the
Catholic Bishop of Chicago possessed considerable bargaining
strength in his negotiations with the publisher of liturgical music
because of the size of his parish and the relatively limited market
for the music. In Moor-Law, however, the owner of the Triple
Nickel could exercise only minimal bargaining leverage against the
performing rights organization. In both cases, the courts deter-
mined that CBS III applied and held that the blanket licenses did
not violate the antitrust laws.215 Thus, the post-CBS III cases ad-
dressing blanket license systems demonstrate an ad hoc decision-
making process that has upheld blanket licensing except in Buffalo
Broadcasting.
Given the peculiar nature of the music industry and the com-
peting public policy concerns in antitrust and copyright laws,216 in-
consistent ad hoc judgments may be inevitable in the blanket li-
censing area. Copyright holders founded the performing rights
societies to ensure adequate enforcement of the copyright laws and
adequate remuneration for use of their members' music. 21 7 Courts,
in contrast, must strive both to promote competition and to ensure
that composers receive just compensation for their works. Because
regular market forces are incapable of setting a competitive price
for performance rights in musical compositions,2"' aggrieved par-
213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
216. Congress enacted the antitrust laws to preserve and promote competition through
increased innovation and productivity. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 296; see
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Copyright laws, however, give
composers a legal monopoly over the use of their compositions in order to create substantial
incentives for composers to produce more compositions. See supra notes 12-14 and accom-
panying text.
217. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
218. Professor Cirace has stated:
Neither ASCAP's present blanket licensing system nor compulsory individual con-
tracting between television networks and composers establishes economically accept-
able bargaining rules in the market for musical performance rights. If ASCAP were to
continue to bargain without restriction on behalf of copyright owners, then price would
tend to the monopoly price, which is higher than a competitive price. If copyright own-
ers were to deal directly with CBS, then price would tend to the monopsony price,
which is lower than a competitive price.
An attempt to avoid the monopoly-monopsony problem by asking what the price
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ties often seek judicial relief-setting the stage for a clash of the
competing dictates of copyright and antitrust laws. Such litigation
places courts in the unenviable position of either promoting com-
petition by invalidating blanket licensing systems at the expense of
copyright holders, or protecting copyright holders by upholding
potentially coercive blanket licenses at the expense of licensees.
The Buffalo Broadcasting decision may have remedied the in-
equities present in the particular instance of blanket licensing it
addressed, but the decision has produced "utter chaos" in the mu-
sic rights licensing field.2 19 The Second Circuit likely will remedy
this chaos by following the Supreme Court's ruling in CBS III and
reversing Buffalo Broadcasting. A CBS III analysis would compel
a finding that blamket licensing's advantages outweigh its anticom-
petitive effects, and thus should mandate that the Second Circuit
reverse the decision in Buffalo Broadcasting. Furthermore, the ap-
pellate court should emphasize that the consent decree affords
these plaintiffs an adequate remedy.
The 1950 amended consent decree, provides the judicial ma-
chinery to administer equitable blanket license pricing by empow-
ering the Southern District of New York to set a reasonable price
for musical performing rights when the negotiating parties fail to
agree. 2 0 Dissatisfied parties, however, have never tested this judi-
cial relief provision to determine whether it is an effective safety
valve.2 2 1 The facts in Buffalo Broadcasting present precisely the
sort of situation in which the court should invoke the consent de-
cree provision. The case arose because the performing rights socie-
ties dominated individual negotiations with local television sta-
tions. If the plaintiffs had applied for judicial relief under the
consent decree, the Southern District of New York could have
fashioned a form and rate of licensing agreeable to both parties.
Instead, the local stations waged an intense antitrust attack on
blanket licensing and won at the trial level.
of musical performing rights would be if the market structure were theoretically com-
petitive would fail. According to the theory of perfect competition, a product's price is
efficient if it equals the cost of producing an additional unit, that is, marginal cost. In
the context of this theory, it is difficult to determine a price for products such as musi-
cal compositions, which, once created, are costless to use. Because an additional per-
formance is costless to the composer, the efficient price of musical performance right is
zero.
Cirace, supra note 50, at 298.
219. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.




If excessive use of the amended consent decree's judicial relief
provision places too great a burden on the Southern District of
New York, then Congress, which in the past has regulated compos-
ers' rights,222 could empower the Copyright Royalty Tribunal2 s to
determine the price and format of music licenses and oversee mu-
sic licensing disputes. If Congress imposed additional duties on the
Tribunal, however, it would have to increase the Tribunal's staff
and funding. The advantages of expanding the Tribunal's author-
ity would be substantial because the Tribunal could draw upon its
specialized knowledge of copyright law and of the structure of the
music industry in making its licensing decisions. The Tribunal,
with proper personnel, could resolve license disputes more expedi-
tiously than could federal courts in antitrust cases such as CBS,
which not only crowd the federal dockets but also take years to
resolve.
224
Several commentators recently have suggested some form of
legislative exemption or government regulation as the ultimate so-
lution to the conflict between copyright and antitrust laws.225 One
author,2 26 writing after CBS II 227 proposed that Congress exempt
performing rights societies from the antitrust laws as it does labor
unions, agricultural cooperatives, state regulated insurance compa-
nies, and export trade associations. 22  Another author, also writing
222. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (combining markets for the sale of sheet music);
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 801 (1976) (regulation of the right to make phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 118
(1976) (regulation of music performance rights licensed to noncommercial television sta-
tions); Cirace, supra note 50, at 300.
223. As part of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976), Congress cre-
ated the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, a five-member independent agency, to oversee the
compulsory licensing of noncommerical media, cable television, and jukebox operators. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976) (governing organization and operation of Copyright Royalty
Tribunal); 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (1976) (jukeboxes); see also Brennan, The Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 196 (1978).
224. The CBS litigation, for example, began in 1975 at the district court level and
ended in 1981 when the Supreme Court denied certiorari and declined to rehear an appeal
of the Second Circuit's decision on remand. CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981), reh. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
225. See Cirace, supra note 50, at 277; Comment, supra note 20, at 95; Note, supra
note 7, at 784; see also BMI v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 771 (D. Del. 1981).
226. Note, supra note 7, at 783.
227. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
228. 'See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976) (labor unions); 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976) (agricultural
co-operatives); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976) (state regulated insurance companies); 15
U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (export trade associations); see also Adams, Business Exemptions from
the Antitrust Laws: Their Extent and Rationale, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST POLICY 273
(A. Phillips ed. 1965). In addition, the author proposed that some form of government regu-
lation accompany this exemption. Note, supra note 7, at 802-03.
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after CBS II, advocated public regulation of the licensing of music
performing rights. 229 This author maintained that Congress should
preserve the blanket license system, but should allow licensees to
seek administrative or judicial relief if blanket licensing fails to
meet their needs.
Blanket licensing undoubtedly satisfies the performing rights
organizations; and the major networks, with the notable exception
of CBS, tolerate the system as it now exists.23 0 Blanket licensing is
unfair, however, to those music users who cannot negotiate at
arm's length with the performing rights organizations. Since the
performing rights organizations are unwilling to adopt other forms
of licensing, legislative remedies are needed to lessen the effect of
disparate bargaiiiing positions.
The advent of a case like Buffalo Broadcasting, however, indi-
cates that the antitrust interests in protection of economically
weaker businesses now may be strong enough to rival the copyright
interests that led to the formation of huge entities such as ASCAP
and BMI. Thus, if society determines that these powerful perform-
ing rights organizations are too strong, a legislative solution may be
necessary to lessen the effect of the performing rights organiza-
tions' tremendous bargaining strength. Although introducing gov-
ernment regulation into the performing rights industry could cause
more problems than it solves, the realities of the music licensing
market preclude reliance on natural market forces to produce a
competitive price for the use of music. This Recent Development,
therefore, advocates that as part of the ultimate resolution of the
conflict between antitrust and copyright laws in the blanket licens-
ing context, the performing rights organizations be exempted from
antitrust sanctions, but concomitantly be placed under a system of
government or judicial control.
VI. CONCLUSION
If an antitrust exemption for the licensing of music performing
rights existed, courts would not have to make the difficult choice of
maintaining or rejecting blanket licensing. Congress could declare
performing rights societies exempt from the antitrust laws and em-
power an administrative body, such as the Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal, to handle license disputes, like that of Buffalo Broadcast-
229. Cirace, supra note 50, at 277.
230. The performing rights societies can negotiate at arm's length with the major net-
works. Cirace, supra note 50, at 281 & n.33.
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ing, that arise between copyright holders and licensees. This
administrative body, through rulemaking or adjudication, could re-
place blanket licensing with a license tailored to the parties' indi-
vidual needs and circumstances. Such a license would further the
twin aims of preventing free use of compositions and avoiding the
potential coercion inherent in all-or-nothing licenses.
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